














































ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
Claudine Desrieux, Eshien Chong, and Stéphane Saussier
PUTTING ALL ONE'S EGGS IN ONE BASKET:




ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
Loyola de Palacio Programme on Energy Policy 
 
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 
LOYOLA DE PALACIO PROGRAMME ON ENERGY POLICY 
Putting all one's eggs in one Basket: 
Relational contracts and the provision of local public services 
CLAUDINE DESRIEUX, ESHIEN CHONG, AND STEPHANE SAUSSIER 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2010/86 
 
 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 





© 2010 Claudine Desrieux, Eshien Chong, and Stéphane Saussier 
Printed in Italy, November 2010 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 







Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), directed by Stefano Bartolini since 
September 2006, is home to a large post-doctoral programme. Created in 1992, it aims to develop 
inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the 
process of integration and European society. 
The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc 
initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, 
reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the 
European Union.  
Details of this and the other research of the Centre can be found on:   
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:   
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
Loyola de Palacio Energy Policy Chair 
The Loyola de Palacio Energy Policy Chair was created in October 2008 at the RSCAS in honor of 
Loyola de Palacio, former Vice President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Energy 
and Transportation in the Prodi Commission. It promotes research in the area of energy policy. It is 
funded by contributions from sponsoring companies and is directed by Professor Jean-Michel 
Glachant.  
 
The Chair focuses on the connected fields of energy economics, energy law, energy regulation, energy 
geo-politics, and energy resources. It addresses topics including achievement of the EU internal 
energy market; sustainable energy systems and the environment; energy security of supply; the EU 
model of energy regulation; the EU energy competition policy; the EU policy towards carbon free 
energy systems in 2050. 
 
This series of working papers aims at disseminating the work of scholars and practitioners on the 
above-mentioned energy policy issues. 
 
 
For further information 
Loyola de Palacio Energy Policy Chair 
Email contact: yannick.perez@eui.eu  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
European University Institute 
Via delle Fontanelle, 19 
I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Fax: +39055 4685755 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Loyola/Index.shtml Putting all one’s eggs in one Basket: Relational contracts and the






The provision of local public services is increasingly being contracted out to private companies.
We observe that local governments regularly choose the same private operator for a range of different
services, and develop a model of relational contracts that shows how this strategy may lead to better
performance at lower cost for public authorities. We test the implication of our model using an
original database of the contractual choices made by 5000 French local public authorities in the years
1998, 2001 and 2004.
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1 1 Introduction
During the last few decades, the role of the private sector in the management of public services has
been the subject of some debate, particularly within local government. In many countries, local public
authorities such as municipalities must provide a wide range of services (e.g. street repair, water man-
agement, sewage treatment and disposal, urban transport). Recent data show the increasing involvement
of the private sector in the management of these services. In the U.S.A. for example, around one third
of residential solid waste collection, solid waste disposal and street repair services are provided through
contracts with private ﬁrms (Levin and Tadelis (2008)). In Europe, the use of outsourcing has yielded
even greater levels of success: 63% of medium-sized French cities contract out their water treatment and
distribution functions, and 58% of them outsource their sewage treatment (Dexia Crédit Local de France
(2006)).
Although the debate about the management of local public services focused ﬁrst on the determinants of
privatization (Williamson (1999); Hart et al. (1997); Lopez de Silanes et al. (1997)), there is now a fair
degree of interest in some of the other issues involved. For example, some authors have compared the se-
lection mechanisms (competitive bidding and negotiation) in order to determine their relative efﬁciency
(Bajari et al. (2009)). Revenue sharing arrangements have also been studied (Engel et al. (2001, 2006)).
The question of what determines the choice of private operators, however, has received rather less at-
tention. Interestingly, local public authorities tend tocontract out several different services to the same
operator, even if they have access to a number of potential candidates (e.g. Gence-Creux, 2001). We
herein consider the reasons why public authorities often choose to "bundle" their services in this way.1
We herein show that bundling may represent a way of making contracts self-enforcing, thereby achieving
a greater efﬁciency, i.e. an optimal level of cost-reducing investment at a lower price for consumers.
The perspective we adopt herein takes contractual incompleteness for granted. Indeed, the quality of
services required by a public authority is often difﬁcult or prohibitively costly to specify ex ante, at least
in a way that can be enforced by a court of law (Hart et al. (1997)). As a consequence, renegotiation
will occur ex-post. Yet, following the notion of "relational contracts" as deﬁned by Baker et al. (2002) or
Baker et al. (2008), tacit dealings between the parties concerned may create some incentives to invest in
1The "bundling" of services described herein implies that the public authority decides to contract out several different
services to the same private operator, rather than relying on a different operator for each service. Thus, "bundling" is always
initiated by the public authority.
2elements that are non-contractible. Because informal agreements cannot be enforced, self-enforcement
arises as a result of the potential for future business between the partners, and with respect to reputational
factors. The ﬁndings of Goldberg (1976), or recent reports such as that of the European Commission
(2004b), underscore how informal relationships between public and private contractors may help to cir-
cumvent the difﬁculties found in formal contracting.2
We begin by developing a model in which a public authority decides to contract out the management of
two services, whose non-contractible investments have different effects on the resulting social beneﬁt.
The public authority can decide to use a single private operator for both services, or to choose two dif-
ferent operators with two separate tenders. The key question we consider here is whether this decision
affects the ways in which providers address non-contractible outcomes. We show that whether or not
the transactions are bundled has no effect on efﬁciency in a static framework. However, where parties
have concerns about future business opportunities, things are different. We demonstrate that a private
partner may agree to invest at a level that is socially optimal provided that he is rewarded for such behav-
ior by a bonus, or by a promise that he will subsequently be re-engaged. We show that for two different
services, informal agreements are more easily sustainable when the private manager is awarded both con-
tracts. This effect is similar to the effect of multimarket contacts as described by Bernheim and Whinston
(1990) in their study of collusion. We extend the idea of multimarket contacts with different cost func-
tions to a public-private relationship, and explore the consequences with regard to the performance of
public services. More speciﬁcally, in our model, we show that the bonus that the public authority must
pay to achieve the social optimum is lower when both contracts are awarded to the same operator, which
implies that the total price paid for the management of both services is also lower.
We test the implications of our model using an original panel database containing data from the French
Environment Institute (IFEN) and the French Health Ministry (DGS). The data consist of information
related to 5000 local public authorities and their contracts in force in 1998, 2001 and 2004. The French
case is particularly interesting, because municipalities have a legal obligation to provide some services
but are free to choose how to do so. Many municipalities choose to contract out the provision of services,
and allocate contracts through a franchise bidding process (Demsetz (1968)), an allocation mechanism
2Case studies undertaken by World Bank (2006) (p.180) in Manilla and Gabon show the role of informal dealing in public-
private partnerships. The World Bank reports some informal commitments to additional investment by the concessionaires over
the lifetime of a contract. Case 17 in the Resource Book on PPP Case Studies (European Commission (2004b)) summarizes
the German experience (Mülheimer Entsorgungsgesellschaft mbH), and states that “to handle the complex multidimensional
objectives and to protect their interests the parties had to agree on several informal and formalized agreements" (p.84).
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operator involves some negotiation, with room for informal agreements. For all these reasons, our data
set provides us with a large, relevant and unique sample with which to assess our proposition.
Our results show that the use of the same operator for both the distribution and the sanitation of water
leads to a signiﬁcant price reduction for consumers. As a consequence, while previous works (Gence-
Creux (2001)) have considered bundling as evidence of collusion or corruption, our results suggest that
bundling may be a strategy for achieving better efﬁciency, and may beneﬁt consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the relevant literature and specify the
contribution of our paper within it. In Section 3, we describe the institutional details of the management
of local public services in France. We then present the model that yields our main propositions (Section
4). In Section 5, we present our data and tests. Our conclusions follow on from this.
2 Related literature
We believe that our paper makes an important contribution to the literature on relational contracting
and on public-private partnerships. Our modeling approach is inspired by previous work on relational
contracts as discussed by Baker et al. (1994, 2002, 2008). In particular, these authors show how objective
and subjective performance measures may be optimally combined to ensure the provision of incentives.
In our own paper, the combined use of formal and informal tools also helps to circumvent the difﬁculties
experienced in contracting. However, our contribution departs from the approach of the authors cited
above who considered the perspective of future transactions to be the main element in the enforcement
of informal dealings. In contrast, we herein propose that the number of transactions that take place
between identical partners also affects the enforcement of informal contracts. We further provide what
we believe to be the ﬁrst econometric test of this proposition using a database of public-private contracts.
In a broader sense, organizational choices in the management of local public services were also studied
by Levin and Tadelis (2008) and Lopez de Silanes et al. (1997). Both studies relied on U.S. data and
focused on the determinants of privatization. Levin and Tadelis (2008) empirically observed, among
other things, that a given service is more likely to be privately contracted if a city privatizes one other
additional service. However, they provide no explanation of this phenomenon. Relying on the French
4
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operator in terms of the electoral concerns of mayors. Using our theoretical and empirical results, we
propose an alternative explanation for the case of benevolent governments. Other studies in the recent
economic literature have explored related themes. In their study of collusion, Bernheim and Whinston
(1990) examine the effect of multimarket contacts on the degree of cooperation that may be sustained
by ﬁrms in settings where repeated competition occurs. Our methodological approach draws heavily
on this work, but our results differ in that we show how cooperation can also contribute to the increase
of consumers and welfare surplus. The combination of multiple projects under the management of one
single provider has also been analyzed by Laux [2001] but in a different context. Using a principal-
agent model, he shows how the bundling of projects can lead to the relaxation of the limited liability
constraint by allowing punishments for projects that fail, instead of rewards reducing a manager’s rent
from each project. Our view is somewhat different here, because we emphasize the ways in which
the bundling of projects can represent a rational strategy within an incomplete contract framework to
help the enforcementof informal agreements in a public-private relationship. Finally, Yurukoglu (2008)
shows how the bundling of television channels inﬂuences the bargaining outcomes achieved between
distributors and channels, and increases social welfare. We share the view of this author that a bundling
strategy may increase social welfare, however, his modeling approach differs from ours, because he relies
on an industry model that is grounded by its institutional details and its historical data.
3 Institutional Details: Local public services in France
3.1 Contracting out of local public services
The 36,551 municipalities in France are legally responsible for the satisfactory operation of many dif-
ferent public services (such as urban transport, the distribution of drinking water, sewage treatment, the
collection and processing of household waste, social actions and cultural activities). National legislation
requires that adequate (both in terms of quantity and quality) services be supplied to every potential user
in the local community. Municipalities may decide to operate these services themselves (possibly in
5
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a common strategy4 for the management of operational tasks, or to encourage investment in the public
service.
The relationship between a municipality and a private operator is governed by contracts, for which there
is no central regulatory body.5 Among other things, the contract formalizes the result of the negotia-
tions on price. Only the environmental aspects, and the standards of quality of the services concerned
are controlled by local and national environmental agencies. Therefore, as underlined by Nauges and
Thomas (2000), the French system for the organization of water supply is different from that found in
England and Wales (where an independent agency, OFWAT, regulates the regional companies that own
the municipal water infrastructure and implements a price-cap policy), or in the U.S.A. (where private
utilities are subject to public regulation, in order to ensure that rates are fair, given a reasonable efﬁciency
of the system). Consequently, in France, signiﬁcant differences in price may be observed between
one city and another.
Surprisingly enough, when contracting out, municipalities (at least in France) appear regularly to choose
the same private ﬁrm to manage different services. The following graph from Gence-Creux (2001) shows
the percentage of muncipalities in 2001 that chose the same private operator to manage different pairs
of services. For example, more than 50% of the municipalities that contracted out both their water and
garbage services chose the same private operator. We note that nationally, three large companies share
the market for public services, but some other (smaller) providers appear at the local level. Although only
a few ﬁrms operate in the market for public services, the observed concentration is above the theoretical
level that may be expected. Such a theoretical level is derived under the assumption that each ﬁrm that is
willing to enter the market has an equal probability of winning the contract.6
3In contrast to the U.S.A., there is no contracting out to public agencies. The municipality either provides the service itself
or contracts it out to a private ﬁrm. Different contractual agreements exist that give more or fewer responsibilities to the private
partner. We describe these contractual arrangements in the empirical section.
4As stated in the introduction, a recent ofﬁcial report (Dexia Crédit Local de France (2006)) states that 63% of French
medium-sized cities contract out the services of potable water treatment and distribution, 58 % also contract out their sewage
treatment, and 69 % use private operators for urban transport.
5Conﬂicts are resolved through the relevant legal system. However, it must be noted that very few cases are ever brought
before the courts. Many potential conﬂicts are solved by the parties themselves.
6For example, assuming that there are 3 ﬁrms in the market that are each capable of providing two services, each of them has
a probability of 1/3 of being chosen for each service. The theoretical probability that a ﬁrm operates both services is therefore
1/9, and the theoretical bundling level is 1/3 (because there are 3 ﬁrms and each has a probability of 1/9 of being awarded both
services). See Gence-Creux (2001).
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Theoretical threshold for bundling of services
Figure 1: Allocation of services to the same operator (Gence-Creux [2001])
Figure 1 illustrates the "bundling strategy" of the municipalities, i.e. the choice of the same private
partner for different services. We now give some details of the selection mechanism used for private
operators.
3.2 Legal procedures to select private operators
In France, whenever a municipality decides to make use of a private ﬁrm to manage a public service,
the service is put to tender. The successful private company beneﬁts from a local monopoly for the
duration of the contract (12 years on average), after which time the market is reopened to competition.
The selection mechanism is different from that seen in many other countries, where the winner is the
candidate with the lowest bid, provided that some objective criteria are met (Auby (1997)). The selection
mechanism in France consists of a two-step procedure:
7
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classical competitive tendering process.
 In the second step, there is a phase of negotiation between the public authority and the potential
operators. At the end of the negotiation, the public authority chooses its partner for the duration of
the contract.
What is important here is that the municipality is not obliged to choose its partner strictly in terms of
objective criteria deﬁned by law, as would be the case in a strict competitive tendering process. This two-
step procedure affords a greater degree of freedom to the public authority. It can select its partner more
freely, using both objective and subjective criteria (the latter during the negotiation stage), even if they are
not necessarily speciﬁed in law. Contracts are said to be concluded intuitu personae, which allows room
for informal discussions. This is a distinctive characteristic of all contracts that involve public partners.7
For all these reasons, we contend that public contracts in France have a relational dimension, and can
provide data with which to test propositions about informal practices.
3.3 The costs and prices of services
When a private company is chosen to manage a public utility, the private ﬁrm and the municipality de-
cide on a price by mutual consent (Nauges and Thomas (2000)). The price of the utility is negotiated
between the municipality (representing the citizens) and the private operator, and is paid by the users. As
a consequence, the price paid for water services is generally the subject of some debate, and is one of the
recurrent political criteria by which the performance of a town council may be assessed. Associations
of consumers regularly publish articles about the price paid in each municipality (Union Fédérale des
Consommateurs (2006)).
During the negotiation, the whole rate structure is determined, i.e. both the type of tariff (linear, two-part,
increasing or decreasing blocks), and the water price charged by unit consumed for each class of user
(farmers, industrial or domestic users). The municipality and the private operator agree on three different
elements: a basic tariff, a formula for annual price revision, and clauses that allow for exceptional condi-
tions.
7Article L 1411-1 of Code Général des Collectivités Locales.
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tract. Aformulaforannualpricerevisionisnecessarybecausetheprivateoperatorbearsasetofoperating
costs that are affected by variations in input prices and productivity earnings. Furthermore, exogenous
shocks on demand may affect the operating conditions. Consequently, the legislation now includes the
possibility of updating the contract terms where appropriate. In any case, the price revision results from
the bargaining that takes place between the parties. The negotiated price must therefore account for both
the management constraints faced by the private operator, and the orientation of the local tariff policy as
deﬁned by the objectives of the municipality concerned.
4 The model
In this section, we present a simple model to show how the use of a bundling strategy may affect the
performance of a private operator in the management of local public services.
4.1 The general framework
Following Hart et al. (1997)8, we assume that a benevolent public authority (to whom we refer as “she”)
is responsible for providing two public services to users. We denote these services as A and B. In order
to provide these two services, we assume that the public authority must rely on external managers who
operate under a contract.
We assume that the contracts are incomplete, as deﬁned by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
(1990) or Hart (1995). Therefore, in the execution of a contract, the private operator of a service may
come up with new and innovative ways to reduce the costs of provision of the services concerned. Such
innovative efforts are uncontractible ex ante, but observable ex-post (and veriﬁable), provided that the
relevant contingencies have been realized.
8We use the general framework of Hart et al. (1997) but diverge from it in two respects: ﬁrstly, we will not consider
public provision, in order to focus on the strategy of bundling when contracting out. Secondly, we focus on only one type of
uncontractible investment, namely the opportunity for cost-reducing innovation, because such investments raise issues in the
case of privatization, while incentives to innovate in terms of quality are closer to their optimal level under private provision
than they are under public provision.
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We herein assume that, ex ante, for each service, the cost of provision incurred by an operator is C0
s,
s 2 fA ;Bg. For simplicity, this cost is assumed to be the same for all operators, and known to all. In
the same way, we denote the beneﬁts to society from the provision of the service s as B0
s, s 2 fA ;Bg.
Following Hart et al. (1997), we call this service the "basic" service, and denote its price P0
s . This price
reﬂects the ex ante bargaining powers of the parties concerned.9
Operators may undertake some uncontractible efforts in order to reduce the costs of the service they
provide. The cost-reducing innovations for a given service s are denoted es, s 2 fA ;Bg. After the
implementation of these innovations, the costs of providing a service s are
Cs = C0
s   cs(es) + es
where cs(es)  0 is the reduction in costs that corresponds to the innovation es for the service s.10
However, the function of the social beneﬁts is different for service A and service B. This assumption
illustrates the varying effects that the cost-reducing opportunities have on the different services. More
precisely, service A is a “simple” service, because its social beneﬁts are contractible, so that BA = B0
A .
In other words, cost reductions do not have any effecct on the quality of the service provided.
In contrast, the social beneﬁts of providing service B are given by the equation BB = B0
B   bB(eB),
where B0
B represents the contractible level of quality, and bs(es)  0 is the reduction in quality created
by the cost-reducing innovations for service B.11 Indeed, we assume that innovations in cost reduction
may have an adverse effect on quality. In other words, both cost and quality can be reduced because of the
opportunites for innovations denoted by “e.” This corresponds to the classic case of Hart et al. (1997),
which accounts for those critics of privatization who often argue that “private contractors would cut
quality in the process of cutting costs because contracts do not adequately guard against this possibility”
(Hart et al. (1997), p. 1128). These fears are particularly relevant in the case of environmental services
such as water supply or sanitation because they are closely related to public health. Furthermore, private
9As described in the institutional details, the price is negotiated between the ﬁrm and the private company. Each service is
intended to generate a surplus for the operator.
10We make the following assumptions: cs(0) = 0, c
0
s(0) = 1, c
0
s(es) > 0, c
00
s(e
s) < 0 , c
0
s(1) = 0.
11We make the following standard assumptions: bB(0) = 0, b
0
B(eB)  0, b
00
B(e









B(eB)  0 imply that the quality reduction from a cost innovation for service B does not offset the
quality increase.
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one of these companies states that "Research is a priority (...) Our mission is to take up the environmental
industrial challenge by devising disruptive technological solutions and applying them on an international
scale. We create new models based on an anticipation of tomorrow’s requirements rather than waiting
for a problem to emerge before taking action (...) Our research is targeted at (...) optimizing operational
cost".12
As is standard practice in the literature on incomplete contracts, we assume that cs, bB, and eB are ob-
servable to the contracting parties, but not veriﬁable to outsiders (e.g. the courts).
We further assume that the public authority is benevolent, and so makes the decisions to maximize the
surplus enjoyed by consumers.13 Furthermore, parties may solve the problem of contractual incomplete-
ness by leveraging the value of future relationships. This means that relational contracts (Bull (1987);
Baker et al. (2002); MacLeod (2007)) can be implemented. In our model, the aim of informal contracts
is to motivate the operator to achieve the ﬁrst-best level of investments eFB, in exchange for a supple-
mentary monetary transfer from the public authority to the operator. This transfer can take the form of a
higher ex anteprice, as agreed when the contract is signed at T=0. The timing of the one-shot static game







A  public  authority  contracts  out  two 
services.  She  can  choose  the  same 
private  operator  or  not  for  the  two 
services. Once the operator(s) has/have 
been  chosen,  (formal  and  possibly 
informal) contracts are signed.    
 
The operator chooses his level of innovation 
efforts, i.e. respects or not the informal dealing 
At the end of the contract, 




Figure 2: Timing of the game
Under this framework, the public authority is confronted with the decision of whether to use the same
private operator for the provision of both services, or to contract out the provision of each service to a
12 Report "Research and Development 2008", Veolia Environment.
13 As in HSV [1997], the public authority G does not maximize the global surplus during renegotiations; its utility function is
reﬂected in the welfare of the rest of society, excluding the manager M. Indeed, “The political process aligns G’s and society’s
interests (since M has negligible voting power, his interests receive negligible weight). As will become clear, if G placed the
same weight on M’s utility as on the rest of society, the ﬁrst-best could be achieved”.
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4.2 The ﬁrst-best
We brieﬂy derive the ﬁrst-best case as a benchmark. In this situation, we assume contractual complete-





s   bs(es) + cs(es)   es]
where s 2 fA ;Bg and bA (eA ) = 0. Therefore, the ﬁrst-best level of the efforts made for cost-reducing
innovations for service B are characterized by c0
B(eFB
B )   b0
B(eFB
B ) = 1. For service A , they are given
by c0
A (eFB
A ) = 1, because bA (eA ) = 0.
4.3 The one-shot game
As demonstrated by Hart et al. (1997), private provision leads to the following payoffs:




and for the private operator: UMs
s = P0
s   C0
s + cs(es)   es
In maximizing his payoff, the private operator of service s chooses eNB
s such that c0
s(eNB
s ) = 1.
The efforts devoted to the achievement of cost-reducing innovations are optimal. However, for service
B, contractual incompleteness leads to his making an excessive amount of effort to reduce costs.14
The granting of both contracts to the same operator in this case has no effect on the outcomes con-
cerned.15 This is obvious, given our assumption that the services are in no way related. All this is
summarized in the following proposition:
14This is because the private operator does not sufﬁciently internalize the negative effects of cost-reducing innovations for
society as a whole, and because his incentives for quality-enhancing innovations are dampened by the fact that he only receives
half the beneﬁts of those innovations at the margin.




















B ) = 1.
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when costs are reduced, it is irrelevant whether a public authority considers awarding the contracts to
the same operator or to different ones.
4.4 The repeated game framework and relational contracting
In this subsection, we follow the standard mechanism described in the literature of informal and relational
contracting (Bull (1987); Baker et al. (1994, 2002); Klein (1988, 1996)). These authors either show how
the occurrence of repeated interaction between partners helps to achieve ﬁrst-best outcomes that are
not otherwise achievable through formal contracts, or suggest that reputational effects can limit hold-up
problems. Using repeated games, we show why the value of future business should lower the over-
optimal incentive of the private operator to invest in cost reduction. Furthermore, as in Bernheim and
Whinston (1990), we emphasize how multimarket contacts facilitate this mechanism.
More precisely, we assume that the public authority can offer an informal contract to the private operator
that speciﬁes the ﬁrst-best level of effort eFB
B .
Let us denote U
M;FB
B ( resp. U
G;FB
B ) as the payoffs of the operator of service B (resp. of the public
authority) when ﬁrst-best investments are made during the management of service B. To compensate
for the decrease in the proﬁts of the private operator, the public authority promises him a transfer T that
takes the form of a higher ex ante price. As described in subsection 3.3, this price is determined by the
parties when the contract is signed at T=0. At this time, the public authority can propose an informal
deal, in that she accepts a higher price and in exchange asks the private manager for ﬁrst-best levels of
investment.16











A period in our framework is the contract duration. Thus, in each period, the public authority can choose
either to continue the relationship or to end it. Then, if the private operator does not respect the informal
16As a consequence, the total ex ante price in case of relational contracting is P
0
s and the bonus T.
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public authority will reselect him for subsequent periods with a probability 0  p  1, and will refuse
to do so with a probability (1   p). We assume that the public authority cannot threaten to eliminate the
operator altogether, because in some cases, there is no alternative to this private manager (i.e. there is no
other candidate), or the costs of resorting to public provision are too high. For simplicity, we assume that
p does not change over time. The probability (1 p) allows us to account for the outside options available
tothepublicauthorityshouldhedecidetochangetoanotheroperatorattheendofthecontract.18 Because
the public authority is not always able to eliminate the manager from future negotiations in the case of
deviation, the threat of punishment may be insufﬁcient to provide incentives for him to cooperate. For
this reason, the public authority also proposes an award (the bonus T) in the case of cooperation. As a
consequence, both the perspective of future business and the promised monetary award are intended to
provide the appropriate incentives.
It should be noted that the only relevant information about the previous period is whether or not there
has been any deviation. The discount factor is 0    1. It then remains to be determined what kind
of transfer T (i.e. sharing of the surplus) allows the relational contract to be self-enforcing. To model the
relational contract, we use a trigger strategy.
We will show that when two contracts - one with and one without adverse effects - are signed by the same
partners, the level of transfer (TA +B) is lower than the level (TB) when only one contract is contracted
out. As a consequence, under relational contracting, the total price paid by the public authority for the
services is lower in the case of bundling than in the case of non-bundling.
17 We assume that beneﬁts that accrue from the optimal management of public services that are dedicated to the public
interest are sufﬁciently high that the public authority would have adequate incentives to respect her end of the deal, i.e. to pay
the minimum amount of bonus necessary to provide the private operator with incentives to undertake his investment efforts.
This can be seen in view of the fact that the public authority’s alternative option would not enable her to achieve the ﬁrst-best
outcome if she does not honor the informal contract. For this reason, we only explore the conditions under which the manager
respects his informal promise (and not those of the public authority). However, we are aware that this assumption may be too
restrictive, and we intend to explore this issue in greater detail in the near future.
18In our incomplete contract framework, the threat of not being renewed for service A causes real damage to the manager,
since this service generates an ex post surplus because of the non-contractible innovations that occur during the execution of
the contract, and because of the negotiated price (as described in the institutional details).
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We now suppose that the public authority has chosen a different operator for each service.
For service A , there is no need to implement any relational agreement to achieve the ﬁrst-best, because
the incentives of the private manager correspond to the optimal levels, even in the one-shot game. The
total price paid by the public authority is then P0
A , as described above.
For service B, ﬁrst-best levels of incentives are achieved only if the relational contract described above is
implemented. Let us denote as TB the transfer of the public authority to the private manager in this case.
We want to determine the level of such a transfer that is required for the relational contract to become
self-enforcing.19 In other words, we determine the level of transfer so that the discounted payoff stream













The private manager gains U
M;NB
B + TB when he deviates, because he still beneﬁts from the transfer




1  (See Appendix A for
derivation). This allows us to show that TB is bounded:










When this condition is satisﬁed, the relational contract is self-enforcing for the private manager.21 Note
that the lower the transfer is, the lower the temptation to deviate for the party that provides the transfer.
Furthermore, since the public authority only cares about the surplus of the consumers, she wishes to pay
19One could argue that the threat of the sanction (i.e. of non-renewal) is sufﬁciently strong to dissuade the private operator
from reneging on the contract. This is true when p ! 0, i.e. the public authority can be rid of the private manager forever. But,
when p ! 1, as discussed in the previous footnote, then the threat is not strong enough and a bonus is needed. Comparative
statistical analysis of the results in the following subsection will show that
dT
dp > 0.
20We consider no outside option for the private manager if his contract is not renewed. It is difﬁcult to assess whether other
municipalities will trust him or not, because communication between public authorities is imperfect. Nevertheless, it is hard to
determine precisely how "‘imperfect"’ it is. For simplicity, we then model a bilateral relationship, and assume no outside option
for the manager concerned.




B + TB, i.e. U
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B is such as (2) is just satisﬁed, i.e.
T










Thetotal costforthepublic authoritytoprovide bothservicesis thenP0
A forthe serviceA , andP0
B+T
B,
i.e. the ex ante price P0
B and the ex post transfer, for service B. Denoting PU as the total cost for both




4.4.2 The “bundling” strategy: using the same private operator
Let us now suppose that the two services are bundled, i.e. the same private operator manages both ser-
vices. WewishtodeterminethetransferpaymentTA +B thatmakestherelationalcontractself-enforcing.
As in the previous case, the private manager either accepts the transfer TA +B (through a price increase),
or deviates and prefers to maximize his own proﬁts. As a consequence, the public authority will select
him again for each service with a probability 0  p  1. However, contrary to the case of unbundling,
punishment here is applied to both contracts, i.e. for services A and B. As stated in Bernheim and
Whinston (1990), multi-market contacts increase the level of punishment in the case of deviation.







B + TA +B.
In the case of deviation, he gains on the contract for service B, i.e. U
M;NB
B , but is selected again for




















In the same way as for our previous discussion, the public authority will select the lowest possible amount
22Recall that for service A , the Nash solution for the operator corresponds to the ﬁrst-best, so there is no possible deviation.
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T









The total cost to the public authority is therefore PI = P0
A + P0
B + TA +B.
4.4.3 Cost comparison and proposition
Let us now compare the total cost in each case, i.e. PI and PU.




































B )(p   1)  (p   1)U
M;NB
B , then PI  PD.
Proposition 2 When two services, one with and one without the adverse effects described above, are
managed by a single operator, the public authority can pay a lower total price and still obtain the same
levels of service and investment compared to those obtained when the two services are contracted out to
different private ﬁrms.
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Putting the model to the test
Our model focuses on two types of service, one with and one without adverse effects on quality as a
result of cost reductions. It shows that bundling, i.e the provision of two services by the same private
operator, facilitates the enforcement of relational contracts.
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ments do not affect the quality or the utility of the government (service A in our model). This represents
a signiﬁcant empirical challenge, because it implies some "limited" contractual incompleteness, i.e. a
service for which cost-reducing investments cannot be contracted ex ante, but in which quality is never
damaged by them. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that our results could be extended to the case of two
services, one whose uncontractible cost reductions are likely to result in strong adverse effects on the
quality of the service concerned, and another for which the cost reductions are likely to generate only
weak adverse effects. A comparison of our theoretical ﬁndings to empirical data therefore requires us to
identify two services - one characterized by high and the other by low adverse effects on quality follow-
ing the imposition of uncontractible cost reductions. Our model then suggests that the prices paid by the
public authority are likely to be lower in the case of bundling than in the case of unbundling.
The French water sector appears to provide a particularly interesting testing ground for our propositions,
by virtue of the fact that there are two types of water service that a municipality must provide to con-
sumers, namely drinking water and waste water (or sanitation). Those two services are clearly separated
and give rise to two different contracts that may apply with or without the same operator. The provision
of the former service involves the production and distribution of drinking water to the population, while
the latter involves the collection and treatment of foul water. We further observe that in general, ﬁrms
that can provide one of these services can also provide the other.
In addition, it may be seen that quality is a more sensitive issue in relation to drinking water than in
relation to waste water. Hazards to public health exist in both cases, but because of the public safety con-
cerns related to drinking water, consumers are better able to assess quality in this service than they are
in sanitation. As a consequence, municipalities may be rather more concerned with providing adequate
incentives to ensure the quality of drinking water than they are of the quality of treatment of waste water,
especially in terms of their willingness to respond to complaints in order to achieve subsequent electoral
success.23 The differences between the two services may also be highlighted by the numbers of water
quality standards that govern the qualities of drinking water and waste water. European Council Direc-
tive 98/83/EC (Ofﬁcial Journal OJ L 330 of 05.12.1998) of 3 November 1998 on the quality of water
intended for human consumption deﬁnes about 53 water quality standards to which drinking water must
23The European Commission brought France to trial in front of the European Court of Justice in November 2009 as a result
of failures in water treatment by a number of local authorities. This suggests that the service is not taken sufﬁciently seriously
by some public authorities (Le Monde newspaper - November 20th, 2009)
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water treatment deﬁnes only about 5 norms for waste water treatment. This suggests that the control of
quality in drinking water can be more costly and more complicated than it is in waste water.
The French case is also of interest here because of the principle of intuitu personae that regulates the
contracts between public and private partners (hereafter called "public-private partnerships"). A munici-
pality that puts a service out to tender is not legally obliged to publish any objective or subjective criteria
for selecting the winning tender (Auby (1997)). Public authorities also are permitted to negotiate with
bidders before choosing the ﬁnal partner. Such freedom for public authorities introduces subjective el-
ements during the decision-making process, and allows the customization of the relationships that exist
between public and private partners. This leaves room for informal dealings between contractors. This
may also leave room for corruption, as previously explored in research on public procurement (Compte
et al. (2005); Maskin and Tirole (2007)). Our model shows how this informal dimension can also open
the door to potential relational agreements that can yield better incentives for investment.24
5.2 Linking the model with the data
In order to test our proposition, we have developed a unique panel dataset by combining data from
the French Environment Institute (IFEN) and the French Health Ministry (DGS), relating to 4987 local
public authorities in 1998, 2001 and 2004, yielding a sample of 14,961 water services. This sample is
representative of the total population of French local public authorities, in that all local authorities with
more than 10,000 inhabitants are included in the sample, while those with less than 10,000 inhabitants
are represented proportionally. By eliminating observations that have missing data and focusing only
on those municipalities whose services are managed through public-private partnerships, our sample is
reduced to 7002 observations over the three years. Each observation is characterized by a contractual
choice made by a municipality at time t.
Our theoretical model suggests that bundling services together may help to sustain relational contracts
24Relational contracting between public and private partners is not exclusive to France, even if the selection procedure that
governs French public contracts provides good material for such a study. Other examples of implicit dealings in public-private
partnerships are suggested in many other reports, such as the Resource Book on PPP Case Studies (European Commission
(2004b)), the Green Paper of European Commission (2004a) or the toolkit of the Worldbank World Bank (2006).
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Claudine Desrieux, Eshien  Chong and Stéphane Saussierbetween agents and, as such, can lead to improvements in welfare. The main implication of our theo-
retical analysis for the water industry is that prices for drinking water should be lower when the same
operator is used for waste water, i.e. when drinking water services (distribution contract) and sanita-
tion services (waste water contract) are provided by the same operator. Indeed, the model suggests that
bundling services together will affect prices because the contemporary negotiation of both services (i.e.
if the date of signature on both contracts is the same) allows the local authority to negotiate a price that
is lower than for the case of unbundling in order to force the private operator to cooperate. The model
suggests that this effect might also occur when the water distribution contract is signed after the waste
water contract, but not vice versa, of course.25 In order to investigate the effect of bundling on prices,
we created two variables, Bundle1 and Bundle2. The ﬁrst restricts the bundling effect to the case where
the contracts are signed simultaneously for both services. The second also considers bundling when con-
tracts are signed not simultaneously, but when the distribution contract is signed after the waste water
contract. Because the price obtained by operators during the negotiation with local authorities is paid
totally and directly by consumers, we will focus here on consumers’ water bills in order to measure the
effect of bundling.
Simple comparisons of average prices suggest that such an effect exists (See Appendix 3). Nevertheless,
we must take into account the fact that each local authority is unique: each water service is characterized
by a speciﬁc environment that may also affect prices and their evolution (e.g. characteristics of the
networks, size of the population, etc.). Therefore, in order to test the implications of our model, we
need to estimate the effect on price when services are bundled ceteris paribus. A simple method of
doing this is to estimate the impact of bundling on the prices paid by consumers for their drinking water
services whilst controlling for heterogeneity between different water services. A negative estimated
effect of bundling on the water prices paid by consumers would be consistent with the prediction made
in our theory. In addition to the contractual choices made by French municipalities, our data include
information on the respective networks involved, which will help us to deal with any heterogeneities
involved, i.e. the density of the network, the origin of the water, the kind of treatment required to purify
the water prior to distribution, the size of the population affected by the contract, and other aspects that
25The transfer that is negotiated by the local authority with the private operator is translated into price provisions negotiated
in the contract. The model suggests that the bundling effect should only be signiﬁcant with negotiated water distribution prices.
If water distribution prices have been already negotiated without any bundling, giving the same operator the contract for waste
water services afterwards can only affect the distribution prices when the contract is renewed.
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However, our empirical strategy must also account for two further issues: ﬁrstly, a lower price paid
by consumers when drinking water and sanitation services are bundled may also reﬂect the potential
synergies that exist between the two types of service. Secondly, municipalities may endogenously decide
to bundle drinking water and sanitation services, in anticipation of the likely gains for consumers. A
failure to account for the heterogeneity among municipalities that could lead to such decisions could lead
to inconsistent estimates. In the following section, we shall discuss both these issues and present our
econometric speciﬁcation to address these issues within our estimation strategy as a whole.
5.2.1 Synergy issues
The existence of economies of scale and/or scope between drinking water and sanitation services can
provide an alternative explanation for the lower price paid by consumers for their drinking water when a
single operator provides both services. Without addressing this issue, we cannot know from our estimates
the extent to which the effect of contract bundling may be due to the relational contract or to the synergies
that exist between the two services. This is the nature of the challenge that we should address in our
empirical work, even though previous empirical studies appear to have found little evidence of synergies
between these two types of activity.26 In the following section, we shall discuss how this issue may be
dealt with in our empirical estimates.
First of all, we control for the presence of economies of scale in drinking water services by including a
set of variables that measure the scale of production of the services. The population of a municipality,
and its square, may serve such a purpose. Indeed, the larger the population, the higher the volume of
water that must be produced. Furthermore, the quadratic term is a classic means of identifying possible
economies of scale in applied econometric analysis. In addition, we include the variable density, and its
square, which measure the density of the water distribution network as a means of addressing possible
26For example, a report submitted to the UK water regulator OFWAT shows some empirical evidence on this issue for the
water industry in England and Wales (Stone & Webster Consultants Ltd. (2004)). Using data between 1992-93 and 2002-03,
the report found no evidence of economies of scale or scope between drinking water and sewage services. Using data obtained
from water utilities in Wisconsin, Garcia et al. (2007) found no evidence for economies of vertical integration, even between
the production and distribution of drinking water. However, this latter study does not attempt to assess economies of scale or
scope for drinking water and waste water services.
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of scale and density on water prices.
If there are synergies between water and sanitation services, there is no reason to consider that these
should not be constant over time. Thus, these synergies should be accounted for by including municipal-
ity into our regression analysis. In addition, the operators’ ﬁxed effects will be used to run our regres-
sions. In this way, any time-invariant synergies that a speciﬁc operator is able to exploit are accounted
for. By controlling in our empirical analysis for time-invariant municipality and operator unobservable
heterogeneity, the impact of the potential synergies may be neutralized if the latter are constant over time.
The resulting estimate will therefore be likely to reﬂect a “relational contracting” effect.
Finally, the lagged water price may also serve as a proxy for the cost of running the drinking water
service. This is because any synergy would be reﬂected in the cost of services, and water prices are
correlated with such costs. As such, the lagged price could also be relied on to pick up any potential
synergies between drinking water and sanitation services.
These considerations lead us to specify the following model for our econometric analysis:
priceit = Dit + priceit 1 + x0
it + ui + vit + wt + "it (4)
where priceit is the price paid by consumers (exclusive of taxes) per 120m3 of drinking water in munici-
pality i in year t 2 f1998;2001;2004g; Dit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when drinking
water and sanitation services in municipality i are bundled in year t, xit is a vector of observable vari-
ables that control for the characteristics of drinking water services in municipality i at time t; ui is a
term that captures municipality i’s unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity; vit represents the operator
ﬁxed effects; wt represents the year ﬁxed effects, and accounts for events in a particular year that have
an impact on water prices in several different municipalities; lastly, "it is a potentially heteroskedastic
regression error term. We assume that "it ; (0;).
Our econometric speciﬁcation has the potential to allow us to capture the effects of existing synergies,
by identifying economies of any scale or scope. Hence, we may be reasonably conﬁdent that the esti-
mate of  will essentially capture the effect of contract bundling on drinking water prices on top of any
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5.2.2 Endogeneity issues
Another econometric difﬁculty that may arise is the possibility that Dit is endogenous. In particular, there
may be individual heterogeneity in local public authorities or private operators that cannot be observed by
the econometrician, but that is correlated both with the decision to bundle drinking water and sanitation
services and with observed water prices. Failure to account for this dimension may lead to an inconsistent
estimate for .
Any unobservable individual heterogeneity that results in the endogeneity of Dit may be either time-
invariant or time-variant. To the extent that we account for time-invariant municipality and operator ﬁxed
effects in equation (4), we may be conﬁdent that any endogeneity bias that stems from those dimensions
is taken into account in our estimate of equation (4). In this case, Dit will be uncorrelated with "it, and
we will be able to obtain consistent estimates for the effects of bundling on drinking water prices ceteris
paribus.
However, if the decision to bundle both services depends on some unobservable time-varying heterogene-
ity, any estimates obtained from equation (4) will no longer be consistent because Dit will be correlated
with "it. In order to account for this potential source of endogeneity, we explicitly specify the following
equation in order to study the decision of a municipality to bundle both services:
D
it = z0
it + 'i + it
Prob[Dit = 1] = Prob[D
it  0] = Prob[it   z0




it is a latent variable that could represent the propensity of a municipality to bundle both drinking
water and sanitation services; zit is a vector of explanatory variables that inﬂuence the propensity of a
municipality to bundle the two services together;  is a vector of coefﬁcients ; 'i is a term that captures
municipality i’s unobservable time-invariant characteristics; it is an independently distributed standard
normal error term such that it ; N (0;1)27; and () is the cumulative distribution function of a
standard normal random variable. We further assume that 'i is uncorrelated with zit and is distributed
27Consistent with current practice in the literature, we normalize our Probit equation by the standard deviation of it.
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'. This speciﬁcation corresponds to a random-effects
probit model.
To the extent that unobservable time-varying individual heterogeneity that has an inﬂuence on observed
water prices also drives a municipality to bundle the two services, it will be correlated with "it. This will
induce a correlation between Dit and "it. More formally, to address this potential source of endogeneity,






















" is the covariance between it and "it; and 2
" is the variance of "it from equation (4). A
non-signiﬁcant estimate for " would indicate an absence of unobservable time-varying individual het-
erogeneity in the decision to bundle both servies. This system, composed of equations (4) and (5) is
therefore more general, and allows us to account for the potential endogeneity of Dit.
Keeping in mind that our purpose is to obtain a consistent estimate for  that accounts for the poten-
tial endogeneity of Dit, we estimate the system of equations using a two-step procedure. As shown by
Heckman (1979), the issue of the endogeneity of Dit can be seen as a case of speciﬁcation error due to
“omitted variables.” Consistent estimates in this case may therefore be obtained by including estimated
regressors for these “omitted variables.” To this end, we ﬁrst run a random effects probit regression on
equation (5). Following Heckman (1978) and Vella and Verbeek (1999), we then include the resulting
generalized probit residuals in equation (4). This correction term should account for the potential en-
dogeneity of Dit, and the associated coefﬁcient corresponds to ". Accounting for an endogenous Dit
therefore leads us to estimate the following equation:
priceit = Dit + priceit 1 + x0
it + ui + vjt + wt + c it(z0
it + 'i) + "it (7)
where  = " and c it () is the estimated generalized Probit residual obtained from our regression on
equation (5).28
28Alternatively, we could also have substituted Dit in equation (4) with its predicted value from our probit regression to
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(4) in the vector zit (apart from the lagged dependent variable in equation (4)), as well as other instru-
ments to ensure identiﬁcation. Supplementary instruments included in zit are the average percentage of
votes for left-wing candidates in the 1995 and 2002 French presidential elections in the municipality con-
cerned(thevariableLeftWing), asetofdummyvariablesthatindicatestheperiodinwhichthecontractfor
water services has been signed (before 1982, between 1982 and 1993, and after 1993), the average preva-
lence of bundling with the same operator at the time of contracting in different regions (Instrument1) and
the average prevalence of bundling at the time of contracting in different regions (Instrument2). LeftWing
is intended to capture the political and ideological aspects of using relational contracts by a municipality.
Because these are political and ideological motivations for the choice of relational contracts, one may
argue that they do not have a direct impact on water prices and could therefore be considered as instru-
ments. The set of dummy variables that indicate the period in which the contract for water services has
been signed is intended to capture some major changes in French legislation regarding the organization
and provision of public services.29 These laws may have a direct impact on the decision to bundle both
services, and a less direct impact on water prices (since they do not directly regulate prices). Finally,
Instrument1 and Instrument2 are directly inspired by Guasch et al. (2008). If we consider that the source
of endogeneity might be the correlation between the decision to bundle the services and the error term,
because of omitted characteristics of the contracting parties (Operators’ characteristics) and of the con-
tracts (Regional characteristics), these instruments are valid because the correlation between the choice
to bundle services with a speciﬁc operator in a given region is only correlated to Instrument1 through
certain aspects, which by virtue of their construction are independent of those effects that are speciﬁc to
the region concerned. Similarly, the choice to bundle services is only correlated to Instrument2 through
certain aspects, which by virtue of their construction are independent of effects that are speciﬁc to both
the region and the operator concerned.
The following table provides deﬁnitions of all the variables used in the empirical model along with their
descriptive statistics.
account for endegeneity between bundling the services and observed water prices (Heckman (1978); Vella (1998) etc.). We
have also run regressions accounting for endogeneity using this approach and results are similar.
29A decentralization law was introduced in March 1982 that granted municipalities a greater degree of autonomy in their
policies. In 1993, the Sapin law (an anti-corruption law) was introduced to make it compulsory for municipalities to organize
a public tendering if they wished to delegate a public service. This latter also places a ceiling on the duration of contract (a
maximum of 20 years for water services).
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Variable Description N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price Price of water per 120m3 7002 160.58 45.88 52.44 299.53
Bundle1 1 if an identical operator is used for drink-
ing water and sanitation services, and if
contracts are signed in the same year
7002 0.31 0.46 0 1
Bundle2 1 if an identical operator is used for drink-
ing water and sanitation services, and if the
water distribution contract is signed in the
same year, or following the waste water
contract.
7002 0.38 0.49 0 1
TreatA1 1 when the raw water does not need disin-
fection
7002 0.52 0.5 0 1
TreatA2 1 when the raw water needs disinfection 7002 0.17 0.38 0 1
Orig1 1 when the water comes from an under-
ground source
7002 0.16 0.36 0 1
Orig2 1 when the raw water comes from a source
on the surface
7002 0.21 0.41 0 1
Interco 1ifthelocalauthorityisorganizingthedis-
tribution of water in cooperation with other
local authorities
7002 0.74 0.44 0 1
Density Size of the population / Number of km in
the network
6895 141.47 278.22 0 .70 11706.27
Pop Size of the population/10 000 7002 0.98 4.92 0 212.52
Pop2 Square of Population 7002 25.17 939.26 0 45166.7
RenewProg 1 if there is an investment program 7002 0.63 0.48 0 1
Scarcity Total volume distributed / (total volume
distributed + imported)
7002 0.88 0.24 0 1
Limitation 1 if consumed volume of water is con-
strained by regulation for some period of
time during the year
7002 0.07 0.26 0 1
Tourist Takes value 1 if the municipality is in a
tourist area
7002 0.13 0.34 0 1
LeftWing Average of percentage of votes for left
wing parties in the 1995 and 2002 French
presidential elections in the municipality
6974 0.40 0.07 0.08 0.73
D85 1 if a contract is signed before 1985 7002 0.17 0.37 0 1
D8593 1 if a contract is signed between 1985 and
1993
7002 0.24 0.43 0 1
D93 1 if a contract is signed after 1993 7002 0.59 0.49 0 1
Instrument1 Average prevalence of bundling with the
same operator at the time of contracting in
different regions
7002 0.15 0.09 0 0.36
Instrument 2 Average prevalence of bundling at the time
of contracting in different regions
7002 0.53 0.15 0 0.65
5.2.3 Estimation strategy
We exploit the panel dimension of our data in including operator and year dummy variables in order to
capture the potential operator time-invariant effects and events in each year of our observation that may
have an impact on water prices in that year. In order to deal with municipality ﬁxed effects, the Within
Groups estimator or ﬁrst-differencing transformation may be used to remove such effects. However,
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between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term. Hence, the Within
Groups estimator and the ﬁrst-differencing transformation may still yield inconsistent estimates in our
price equation. In particular, it has been shown in the literature that both transformations may lead to a
downward bias for the estimate of  (Nickell (1981)).
Nevertheless, it is suggested in the literature that a ﬁrst-differencing transformation should be used to
remove the unobserved ﬁxed effects. This yields in our case:30 31
priceit = Dit + priceit 1 + x0
it + vjt + wt + "it (8)
where  is the ﬁrst difference operator. Notice that if Dit is correlated with ui, the ﬁrst-difference
transformation allows us to obtain a consistent estimate for  because the municipality ﬁxed effects are
removed after such a transformation (as long as the endogenous choice to bundle both services is only
inﬂuenced by time-invariant unobservable municipality ﬁxed effects). This is one of the points that we
tried to make in the foregoing discussion.
In order to deal with the correlation that arises between the transformed lagged dependent variable and
the transformed error term, Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) suggest using intrumenting the now en-
dogenous transformed lagged variable with the twice lagged dependent variable, i.e. priceit 2 in our
case. The result is a 2SLS estimate of equation (8). Arellano and Bond (1991), building on the former
solution and on the work of Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), propose that the orthogonality conditions between
the transformed disturbances and instruments are exploited in order to obtain consistent estimates for
equation (8). This yields the asymptotically efﬁcient ﬁrst-difference Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator.32
In our own empirical analysis, we will apply both techniques in order to obtain consistent estimates
for equation (8). In particular, we will take advantage of the presence of explanatory variables in our
regression and use them as supplementary instruments. In the following section, we present the results
30For expositional simplicity, we will only focus on equation (4) in the remaining discussion in this subsection. The same
treatment is applied to the estimation of equation (7).
31The ﬁrst-differencing transformation is preferred in this case since the Within Group transformation introduces all previous
realizations of the error term into the transformed error term (Bond (2002)).
32For a review of these econometric techniques, the interested reader is referred to Bond (2002).
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5.2.4 Estimation results and discussion
Table 2 shows our estimates of the impact of bundling drinking water and sanitation services on the
prices paid by consumers in a given municipality.33 The variables of interest in these regressions are the
estimated coefﬁcients Bundle1 and Bundle2. The former is equal to 1 when the contracts for drinking
water and sanitation services are granted to an identical operator in the same year, while the latter allows
for this condition to occur in a more general sense. More speciﬁcally, Bundle2 will take a value of 1 if
an identical operator is used for both drinking water and sanitation services, and if the water distribution
contract is signed in the same year or after the sanitation contract. We treat the bundling decision as
exogenous in these regressions.
Columns (1)-(4) show the estimates for equation (4) using normal econometric techniques, i.e. OLS,
panel random effect, Within Groups estimator and ﬁrst-differencing transformation. We do not account
for the potential endogeneity of the transformed lagged dependent variable in these estimates. In columns
(5)-(8) we have tried to correct for any inconsistency that may arise due to the correlation between
the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term. In column (5) we use the
Anderson and Hsiao estimator, instrumenting priceit 1 with priceit 2 and xit 1. In columns (6)
and (7) we implement the ﬁrst-difference GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The difference
between these columns arises from the dependent variable used in the regressions: in column (6) the
dependent variable is the price paid for drinking water by consumers, while in column (7) we use the
logarithm of the price as the dependent variable. In the regressions for columns (1) to (7), we use Bundle1
as our measure of horizontal bundling. In column (8), we consider another measure for a municipality’s
bundling decision i.e., Bundle2.34
Estimates for priceit 1 from various columns in Table 2 correspond to what may be expected in the pres-
ence of a correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term.
33Note that we lost a year of observations (1998) because of the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in our regressions.
34Regressions that distinguish between contracts that are signed in the same year for an identical operator from cases where
the operator’s water distribution contract is signed after his sanitation contract show that both variables have a signiﬁcant and
similar negative effect on observed water prices. We are unable to reject the hypothesis that both variables impact observed
water prices differently using a Wald test.
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DIF Effects Difference & Hsiao
Dep. Var. Price Price Price Price Price Price ln Price Price
Bundle1 -3.730*** -5.089*** -4.109* -3.645* -3.264+ -4.026* -0.027*
(0.971) (1.098) (1.667) (1.666) (1.803) (1.709) (0.012)
Bundle2 -5.268**
(1.687)
Pricet 1 0.771*** 0.5337*** -0.135*** -0.180*** 0.136* 0.133** 0.175*** 0.130**
(0.017) (0.022) (0.030) (0.036) (0.053) (0.042) (0.031) (0.042)
TraitA1 -0.186 -1.475 6.138* 7.600** 7.668** 8.177** 0.063*** 8.353***
(1.238) (1.471) (2.452) (2.566) (2.644) (2.521) (0.018) (2.514)
TraitA2 1.747 3.257* 2.724 2.347 2.160 1.754 0.009 1.898
(1.327) (1.431) (1.771) (1.807) (1.914) (2.140) (0.015) (2.135)
Orig1 8.362*** 13.029*** 6.910* 0.336 -0.265 -2.740 -0.030 -2.590
(1.460) (1.681) (3.260) (4.655) (4.926) (4.231) (0.031) (4.218)
Orig2 1.107 4.077** 3.571 -0.922 -1.138 -1.988 -0.010 -1.983
(1.335) (1.547) (2.912) (3.648) (3.618) (3.379) (0.024) (3.370)
Intermunicipality 4.050*** 8.393*** 4.696 4.607 4.126 4.101 0.041* 4.054
(1.032) (1.247) (2.973) (2.943) (2.938) (2.638) (0.019) (2.631)
RenewProg 0.543 0.755 -0.709 -1.501 -0.756 -0.920 -0.007 -0.866
(0.861) (0.969) (1.024) (1.045) (1.096) (1.015) (0.007) (1.012)
Scarcity -4.748* -6.194** -4.546 -7.459+ -1.137 -3.456 -0.035 -3.521
(1.857) (2.276) (4.429) (4.372) (4.492) (3.906) (0.028) (3.896)
Limitation 4.259** 2.817+ -1.949 -3.334* -1.792 -1.970 -0.008 -2.031
(1.595) (1.445) (1.354) (1.458) (1.485) (1.489) (0.011) (1.486)
Touristic -1.989+ -0.505 5.561* 6.760* 5.212+ 5.215+ 0.031 5.468+
















Constant 55.383*** 84.407*** 188.684*** 13.925*** 10.816***
(5.244) (6.204) (8.657) (0.661) (0.797)
Year dummy var. Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Operator
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummy var.
Endog. var - - - - Pricet 1 Pricet 1 lnPricet 1 Pricet 1
Sargan test of
- - - -
13.46 (11) 0.40 (1) 0.00 (1) 0.39 (1)
overid. rest.

2 (df) (0.264)c (0.526)c (1.000)c (0.531)c
R
2 0.671a 0.658a 0.234b 0.071a - - - -
N 4671 4671 4694 2176 2106 2176 2168 2176
Standard errors within parentheses.
Huber/White/Sandwich standard errors are given in columns (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6).






c p-value for Sargan statistics.
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transformations are biased downwards. We observe from Table 2 that the OLS estimate for priceit 1 is
positive while the Within Groups estimate and the ﬁrst-difference estimate of this variable are negative.
The use of either the Anderson and Hsiao or the ﬁrst-difference GMM estimator (columns (5) and (6))
to account for the endogeneity of priceit 1 produces estimates that lie between the OLS estimate (col-
umn(1)) and the Within Groups and ﬁrst-difference estimates (columns (3) and (4)). Our results show a
clear need to account for the endogeneity of Priceit 1 in our estimates. It should also be noted that we are
unable to reject the null hypothesis in the Sargan test for overidentifying the restrictions in columns (5) to
(8), which suggests that our instruments are globally valid. The estimated coefﬁcient in these estimations
(columns (5) to (8)) indicates at least a positive correlation between present and lagged prices over time.
Furthermore, our estimates appear to show that unobservable municipality ﬁxed effects are present in our
data. Theresultsofourregressionshowthattheestimatesmadeforsomeofthevariableschangeradically
when the potential correlation between municipality ﬁxed effects and various explanatory variables are
taken into account in the regressions. This is the case for TraitA1, Orig1, Orig2, and Touristic. These
changes may indicate the presence of municipality ﬁxed effects.
It is interesting to note that despite the presence of ﬁxed effects, estimates for Bundle1 are fairly stable
throughout the regressions (columns (1) to (6)). This may be an indication that Bundle1 is not correlated
with the municpality ﬁxed effects. In other words, it would appear that the decision to bundle the two
services together is not driven by the unobservable time-invariant characteristics of the municipality.
Rather more in keeping with the aims of our empirical analysis, the estimates show that consumers in
municipalities where an identical operator is used for both drinking water and sanitation services pay a
lower price for their drinking water services overall. This effect is signiﬁcant in all our regressions, and
works out at around 3.5 euros per 120m3 of drinking water consumed. This represents about 2.7% of the
price for drinking water paid by consumers (according to column (7) of Table (2), in which we use the
logarithm of price as the dependent variable).
It is worthy of note that we ﬁnd a similar effect using a slightly different measure of bundling. As shown
in column (8), the estimate for Bundle2 is both signiﬁcant and negative. The estimate indicates that
observed water prices are lower overall by about 5 euros per 120m3 in municipalities where an identical
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been granted in the same year, or if the water distribution contract has been granted after the contract for
sanitation services.
We are reasonably conﬁdent that the estimates described above reﬂect the effect of the “relational con-
tract” due to the bundling of drinking water and sanitation services, because we have controlled for the
presence of economies of scale and/or scope for both services by including various ﬁxed effects and
lagged prices. As we have previously argued, the ﬁrst of these should account for any potential syner-
gies between the two services provided that these synergies are time-invariant, while the second should
account for any effects due to synergies that vary over time. We therefore believe that the estimated
effect of Dit on the observed prices for drinking water services occurs over and above any considera-
tions of potential synergies. The estimated signs of these coefﬁcients are consistent with our theoretical
propositions that were based on relational contracts.
Nevertheless, the estimates in Table (2) treat Dit as exogenous.35 We now relax this assumption. Table
(3) shows estimation results that take the potential endogeneity of Dit into account. The results for our
random effects probit estimation for Bundle1 (resp. Bundle2) are shown in column (A) (resp. column
(C)) in Table (3). Column (B) (resp. column (D)) shows estimates of our price equation that account
for the potential endogeneity of Bundle1 (resp. Bundle2): we have used the estimated generalized probit
residuals from column (A) (resp. column (C)) to estimate the price equation in column (B) (resp. column
(D)).
It may be seen from Table (3) that the exogenous variables that we have included in the bundling equation
and excluded from the price equation are all signiﬁcant (except for LeftWing in column (C)). However,
the goodness of ﬁt of these probit regressions is generally weak, in particular for the estimates shown in
column (A).
Before discussing the estimates of the price equations, we ﬁrst turn our attention to the impact of our vari-
able Touristic on the probability that drinking water and sanitation services are bundled. Our estimates
35Such an assumption is justiﬁed to the extent that the decision to bundle is motivated by explanatory variables that are
included in our regression and/or by unobservable time-variant heterogeneity at the level of the municipality and/or operator.
The estimates in Table (2) will not have any consistency if the unobservable time-varying heterogeneity that drives the decision
to bundle also has an inﬂuence on observed water prices.
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Claudine Desrieux, Eshien  Chong and Stéphane SaussierTable 3: Estimation results accounting for endogenous horizontal bundling












TraitA1 0.046 7.823** 0.139 8.026**
(0.180) (2.515) (0.202) (2.507)
TraitA2 0.139 1.806 0.151 1.963
(0.178) (2.123) (0.208) (2.116)
Orig1 0.030 -0.565 0.273 -0.232
(0.251) (4.220) (0.312) (4.203)
Orig2 -0.011 0.096 -0.145 0.134
(0.222) (3.363) (0.264) (3.353)
Inter- -1.189*** 3.292 -1.461*** 3.595
muncipality (0.173) (2.651) (0.218) (2.623)
ProgRenouv 0.086 -0.650 0.253* -0.488
(0.097) (1.006) (0.107) (1.003)
Scarcity 0.601* -5.081 0.502+ -5.640
(0.245) (3.922) (0.289) (3.892)
Limitation -0.043 -1.437 -0.096 -1.584
(0.160) (1.479) (0.175) (1.474)
Touristic 1.471*** 6.753* 2.188*** 7.038*



















Density  -0.002*** -0.002***
Pop (0.000) (0.000)





Probit Residuals (1.257) (0.813)
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Operator Yes Yes Yes Yes dummy var.
Endog. Var. - Pricet 1 - Pricet 1
Sargan test
- - - - overid. 0.18 (1)
restr. 2(df) (0.672)a
Pseudo R2 0.08 - 0.11 -
N 6867 2149 6867 2149
Standard errors within parentheses. Signiﬁcance level: + 10% *5% ** 1% *** 0.1%.
Note: a p-value for Sargan statistics.
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other things being equal. To the extent that it may be argued that this variable may serve as a proxy for
uncertainty (because of the inherent seasonal variations in water demand represented by this variable),
such an estimate is consistent with our explanation using relational contracts. Indeed, higher levels of
uncertainty may lead to a greater need for ex post adaptations and ﬂexibility in managing the provision
of services. Relational contracts may be particularly important in this case, because they may facilitate
ex post coordination and cooperation. Hence, one may expect the parties concerned to resort to bundling
to improve relational contracts in this case.
The estimated inter-equation covariance (given by the coefﬁcient associated with the generalized probit
residual) is statistically signiﬁcant in column (B) but not in column (D). This suggests that Bundle1 may
be endogenous, while Bundle2 can be considered as exogenous.36 This observation may reﬂect the fact
that those municipalities that have granted both contracts for drinking water and sanitation services to
an identical operator in the same year deliberately chose to do so. Indeed, in order to pursue such a
strategy, municipalities must ﬁx the duration of the two contracts to ensure that they are granted to the
operator in the same year. This may therefore lead to some non-randomness in Bundle1, and result in
some endogeneity.
Furthermore, the estimates show that the error terms that occur between the bundling equation and the
price equation are positively correlated when we use Bundle1 as measure of horizontal bundling. Any
unobservable time-varying heterogeneity that leads a municipality to bundle both services will also tend
to have a positive impact on observed drinking water prices.
More importantly, having accounted for potential endogeneity, the impact of bundling on the drinking
water prices paid by consumers becomes greater. This is particularly true for those services that are
granted in the same year to an identical operator. Indeed, the estimate for Bundle1 is now greater in terms
of its absolute value compared with the results shown in Table (2); consumers in these municipalities pay
on average 11 euros less, all other things being equal (column (B)). Note also that the estimate for
Bundle2 in column(D) (accounting for potential endogeneity) is also higher in absolute terms than that
obtained under the assumption that Dit is exogenous, although the difference between the two estimates
is substantially smaller. This is consistent with the previous observation that Bundle2 is not endogenous.
36Note that the estimated coefﬁcient associated with the generalized probit residual in column (D) is signiﬁcant at 15%.
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and sanitation services are bundled. This ﬁnding remains robust even when we attempt to control for
other factors such as the synergies that may exist between the two services, and when we attempt to
address various other issues of endogeneity. While the estimated size of this impact varies according
to different speciﬁcations and underlying assumptions, all our estimates show that bundling negatively
affects the drinking water prices paid by consumers, in agreement with the theoretical analysis that we
have developed in this article.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we sought to understand why local public authorities tend to choose the same operator for
different services. We suggest that such a bundling strategy may be desirable because it improves the
efﬁciency of relational contracts that exist between local public authorities and private operators. This
does not imply a need to bundle all services, but justiﬁes why there may be some advantage in bundling
two (or more) services with different cost characteristics, in order to limit any damage to quality caused
by contractual incompleteness. To illustrate this, we have proposed a model that is rooted in the literature
on incomplete contracts. We then showed that under some conditions, the bundling of services leads to
better performance at lower cost for the public authority. This may be explained by the fact that relational
contracts are more easily sustained under these conditions, because any deviations from the relational
contracts can be more severely punished. We then made an assessment of the empirical relevance of
our ﬁndings using data from the French water industry. In particular, the results of our regressions show
that drinking water prices are signiﬁcantly lower when the same operator is in charge of providing waste
water services, ceteris paribus. This empirical result is robust for a variety of conditions and is consistent
with our thesis on relational contracts even if our results cannot tell whether services are provided more
efﬁciently, at a lower cost or both.
Although our study focuses on the water sector, our results could have some practical relevance in other
public services, and some applications in different sectors clearly deserve some further attention in this
regard. However, we shall reserve such considerations for future work.
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Putting all one's eggs in one Basket: Relational contracts and the provision of local public servicesOn the whole, our study suggests that informal dealings and relational contracts are important dimen-
sions in making contracting choices, especially for PPPs, in a world where it is impossible for either
contracting party to anticipate the contingencies that may arise throughout the lifetime of a contract.
These uncertainties should be addressed when considering the use of PPPs for the provision of any pub-
lic service.
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Once the manager has reneged on his informal commitment, he is chosen in subsequent periods with a
probability p 2 [0;1]. This implies that in each period, his expected gain is pUNB
s where s denotes the
service B in the case of unbundling, and denotes the services A and B in case of bundling. We note




t;s represents the expected payoff stream of the manager at period t, once he has cheated in period
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Therefore, if the manager cheats in period t   1, his expected gain is U
M;NB
s in this period because he
will choose a level of investments that maximizes his own present payoff, instead of the ﬁrst-best level.
For the next periods, he expects a discounted gain U
M;E
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TB is both upper and lower bounded. We must show that the lower bound is always lower than the upper
bound in order to prove the existence of TB.




B   (1   p)U
PA;oo
B  TB (9)
and Eequation (3) provides a lower bound to TB:
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B )  0 (10)
We recall that p denotes the probability that the private operator will be chosen again at the next contract
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 If p ! 0, then the previous equation becomes
SFB   U
PA;00







B )  0 (11)
(11) is true because
SFB   U
PA;00
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 If p ! 1, then the previous equation becomes







B )  0 (12)
(12) is true because






B )  0
In conclusion, whatever the value of p, (10) is true, which means that there exists a positive interval in
which TB lies.
Appendix C
Table 4: Share and average water prices of French municipalities using the same operator for drinking
and sanitation services (Calculation by the authors)
Signed Signed Total Average price
at different years the same year 1998 2001 2004 All
Different operators 2988 259 3247 157.32 166.48 177.28 167.06
Same operator 1731 2024 3755 146.89 153.52 164.61 154.99
Total 4719 2283 7002 151.71 159.52 170.51 160.58
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